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 Abstract 
In this paper we present evidence that capital account reversals have become more severe for 
emerging markets. Because policy options are limited in the midst of a capital market crisis 
and because so many countries have already had crises recently, we focus on some of the  
policies that could reduce the incidence of crises in the first place, or at least make the 
sudden stop problem less severe.  In this regard, we consider the relative merits of capital 
controls and dollarization.   We conclude that, while the evidence suggests that capital 
controls appear to influence the composition of flows skewing flows away from short 
maturities, such policies are not likely to be a long-run solution to the recurring problem of 
sudden capital flow reversals. Yet, because fear of floating, many emerging markets are 
likely to turn to increased reliance on controls. Dollarization would appear to have the edge 
as a more market-oriented option to ameliorate, if not eliminate, the sudden stop problem. 
 
 
 
  
* The authors wish to thank Peter Kenen for detailed and careful comments.  Thanks are also 
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 I. Introduction 
 
The Mexican crisis of 1994-1995 was associated with a rescue package of  
unprecedented size. Yet bail-out package notwithstanding, Mexico suffered its largest one-
year output decline in 1995, as GDP shrank by more than six percent. Since Mexico’s crisis, 
international organizations have brokered several more rescue plans involving vast sums of 
funds. Yet, as in Mexico, all the recipients of this financing have had to undertake drastic 
adjustment, as private capital flows dried up.  Furthermore, these countries have had to cope 
with severe recessions. Hence, if we are to assess whether the balance has tilted in recent 
years toward adjustment, despite the larger bail-out packages from the international 
community, we must begin by comparing the severity of recent crises with their earlier 
counterparts.  In what follows, we aim to assess the burden of adjustment by considering 
alternative ways of measuring the severity of crises.  
 
Currency and banking crises are not unique to emerging markets (EMs).   For 
instance, many European countries found themselves engulfed by the currency turmoil that 
spread through the region in 1992-1993 during what is known as the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism Crises (ERM).  Like Mexico, Korea, and Thailand, several of these countries, 
most notably the Scandinavian group,  were also experiencing systemic banking sector 
problems.  Confronted with the incompatible goals of defending the exchange rate peg 
(which would entail maintaining high interest rates) and acting as a lender of last resort to the 
banks, several countries succumbed to the speculative pressures and either allowed their 
currencies to float freely or adopted an arrangement that permitted their currencies to 
oscillate within a wide band.   
 
Thus far, their predicament sounds very similar to that faced by many emerging 
market economies during the 1990s.  Indeed, developed countries and EMs share many of 
the symptoms that are typical antecedents of currency and banking crises.1  Figuring 
prominently among these common symptoms are large capital inflows, asset price and credit 
booms, currency overvaluation, and large current account deficits.2 Where industrial and EM 
economies part company is in the developments that usually follow the onset of crises.  Bail-
out packages were not needed to cope with the currency and banking crises in Europe. 
Furthermore, output did not collapse following the ERM crisis and  none of these countries 
lost their access to international capital markets.  This benign outcome could not be further 
removed from the experience of EMs.  Argentina’s GDP fell more than 4 percentage points 
in 1995, following the unsuccessful speculative attacks associated with the devaluation of the 
                                                 
1 When currency and banking crises occur in close proximity, we will refer to these 
episodes as the “twin crises.”  Further details on the timing and classification of crises 
episodes are provided in Section II. 
2 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) for a comparison. 
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Mexican peso, and Hong Kong, another nondevaluer, is mired in deep recession at the time 
of this writing.  Yet, their bleak performance pales by comparison with the output collapses 
in EMs that have accompanied many of the devaluations both recent and past.  In 1998, 
output fell by 13.7 percent in Indonesia; Mexico’s 6.2 percent output decline in 1995, 
marked the country’s deepest recession.3 
 
Unlike their more developed counterparts, EMs routinely lose their access to 
international capital markets. Furthermore, given the common reliance on short-term debt 
financing, the public and private sectors in these countries are often asked to repay their 
existing debts on short notice.  Even with the recent large-scale rescue packages, official 
financing only makes up for part of this shortfall.  Hence, the need for abrupt adjustment 
arises. Calvo (1998a) has argued that these large negative swings in capital inflows–hereon, 
Sudden Stops or SS–are harmful (this is further elaborated in Section II A).  The corollary is, 
of course, that large current account deficits are to be feared, irrespective of how they are 
financed, but particularly so, if they are financed by short-term debt. The capital inflow 
slowdown or reversal could push the country into insolvency or drastically lower the 
productivity of its existing capital stock. This could be the result of large unexpected swings 
in relative prices and costly bankruptcy battles. 
 
By the time the crisis erupts and a country has lost its access to international capital 
markets, the range of policy options available to the country to manage the situation has been 
severely restricted. Expansionary policies intended to offset some of the devastating effects 
of the capital flow reversal on economic activity and the financial system become only 
possible under the umbrella of capital controls, an option that has little appeal for countries 
not wishing to reverse the process of financial liberalization or that have a distaste for the 
inflationary consequences often associated with such policies.   
 
In this paper we ask whether crises have become in EMs have become more severe 
and what kinds of policies and exchange rate arrangements can make an EM less vulnerable 
to the sudden stop problem in the first place.  While avoiding crises altogether may be a goal 
                                                 
3 The evidence that devaluations are contractionary in developing countries is more 
than anecdotal (see Edwards, 1986 and 1989 and Morley, 1992 for empirical analyses of this 
issue.) 
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well beyond the reach of policy makers, limiting their severity and duration clearly lies 
within the realm of the feasible. 
 
In the next two sections, we provide evidence on the magnitude of the rescue 
packages and of the sudden stop problem and its consequences on output and other key 
economic indicators.  We examine the nature of the recovery process, in an effort to assess to 
what extent the financial sector plays a role in determining the depth of the recession and the 
speed of recovery of the economy.  In Section IV, we turn to the issue of capital controls. 
Specifically, we briefly present the recent experience with controls that are meant to reduce 
the amplitude of the capital flow cycle by altering the maturity profile of the capital inflows. 
We also discuss some alternatives to these measures. In Section V, we examine the relative 
merits of fixed versus flexible exchange rates, including the case of complete dollarization. 
The last section offers some concluding thoughts. 
 
 II. Sudden Stops: Evidence on Painful Adjustment 
 
In this section we briefly sketch the simple analytics of the sudden stop, we then 
move on to provide some stylized evidence on the orders of magnitude of these capital 
account reversals and on the severity of the ensuing crises. 
 
A. Sudden Stops: Analytics 
By national accounting, and abstracting from errors and omissions, capital inflows 
equal current account deficit plus accumulation of international reserves.  Therefore, SS has 
to be met by reserve losses or lower current account deficits.  In practice, both take place.  
While a loss of international reserves increases de country’s financial vulnerability, 
contractions in the current account deficit usually have serious effects on production and 
employment. 
 
To see this, note that, again by national accounting, the current account deficit equals 
aggregate demand minus GNP.  Thus, a sudden contraction in the current account deficit is 
likely to lead to a sharp decline in aggregate demand (the only exception being the unlikely 
case in which there is an offsetting increase in GNP).  The decline in demand, in turn, lowers 
the demand for tradables and nontradables.  The excess supply of tradables thus created can 
be shipped abroad, but the nontradables are, by definition, bottled up at home and, thus, its 
relative price will have to fall (resulting in a real depreciation of the currency).  A prominent 
example is the real estate sector which relative prices have exhibited sharp falls in all recent 
crises. 
 
How does one go from here to infer a loss of output and employment?  We can 
identify two channels: (1) Keynesian, and (2) Fisherian (for Irving Fisher, the Yale 
economist).  The Keynesian channel is straightforward and familiar.  It is predicated on the 
assumption that prices/wages are downward inflexible.  Under these conditions, a fall in 
aggregate demand brings about a fall in output and employment. 
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On the other hand, the Fisherian channel is less familiar but, in our view, potentially 
more damaging.  Financial contracts are, as a general rule, contingent on very few “states of 
nature,” i.e., objective variables, like terms of trade, profit, demand, etc.  A bank loan, for 
example, is typically serviced by a series of fixed installments unless the borrower goes 
bankrupt.  To illustrate the Fisherian channel, we will assume that all loans are made at a 
fixed predetermined interest rate, taking into account expected future variables, but not 
conditioned to their future realizations.  Consider a situation in which the exchange rate is 
fixed and the international price of tradables is exogenous and constant over time. A decline 
in aggregate demand that accompanies SS calls for a lower relative price of nontradables 
with respect to tradables.  Since the price of tradables is stable, to achieve a lower relative 
price of nontradables with respect to tradables, the nominal price of nontradables must fall.  
Thus, since the interest rates is invariant with respect to SS, there is a surge in the ex post real 
interest rate faced by nontradables’ producers, increasing the share of nonperforming loans.  
This problem may be less acute if the currency is devalued because under those 
circumstances the price of nontradables need not fall.  However, there are at least two 
relevant complication that may offset the positive effects of devaluation.  First, many EMs 
are heavily dollarized (see IMF (1999)) and, hence, devaluation is less effective (this is 
obvious if the country is fully dollarized).  Moreover, in countries where asset dollarization 
is not significant (Chile, Indonesia), there still exists sizable liability dollarization (i.e., 
foreign-exchange denominated debts).  Liability dollarization is, in fact, quite general in EMs 
because all of these countries exhibit external debt which, as a general rule, is denominated 
in terms of foreign currency.  It is well known, for example, that Indonesia’s private sector 
had a sizable external short-term debt when crisis hit, ant that this type of debt played a key 
role in the ensuing financial difficulties in that country.  Second, even if there is no 
dollarization to speak of, bank loans, for instance, are of shorter maturity than the underlying 
productive projects.  Since interest real rates are likely to be revised upwards after the SS (as 
a result of, for instance, higher country risk after SS), this also increases the incidence of 
nonperforming loans. 
 
The Fisherian channel enhances the severity of crises because it hits the financial 
sector.  As a result, banks become more cautious and cut their loans, especially to small- and 
medium-sized firms, interenterprise and trade credit dry up, all of which could contribute to a 
major and long-lasting recession (for further discussion, see Calvo (1998a)). 
 
B. Capital inflow reversals 
How big are these capital account reversals?  To answer this question it is useful, 
although not necessary, to get a handle on the size of the capital inflows in the most recent  
inflow episode. 4   Table 1 presents selected evidence on all the major capital importers of the 
                                                 
4 Large capital inflows usually precede these crises, but a large negative swing in the 
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1990s, with the exception of China.  The second column presents the dates of the heavy 
inflow episode, the third column provides information on the magnitude of the cumulative 
inflow, while the last column lists the inflow during the peak year as a percent of GDP.  The 
higher these numbers, the higher the vulnerability to the SS problem. 
                                                                                                                                                       
capital account can also be due to a surge in capital flight. 
Table 1.  Recent Surges in Capital Inflows 
(net private capital flows as a percent of GDP) 
 
Country 
 
Inflow episode 1
 
Cumulative 
inflows/GDP at end 
of episode 
 
Maximum annual 
inflow
 
Argentina 
 
1991-94
 
9.7 
 
3.8
 
Brazil 
 
1992-94
 
9.4 
 
4.8
 
Chile 
 
1989-94
 
25.8 
 
8.6
 
Colombia 
 
1992-94
 
16.2 
 
6.2
 
Hungary 
 
1993-94
 
41.5 
 
18.4
 
India 
 
1992-94
 
6.4 
 
2.7
 
Indonesia 
 
1990-94
 
8.3 
 
3.6
 
Malaysia 
 
1989-94
 
45.8 
 
23.2
 
Mexico 
 
1989-94
 
27.1 
 
8.5
 
Morocco 
 
1990-94
 
18.3 
 
5.0
 
Pakistan 
 
1992-94
 
13.0 
 
4.9
 
Peru 
 
1991-94
 
30.4 
 
10.8
 
Philippines 
 
1989-94
 
23.1 
 
7.9
 
Poland 
 
1992-94
 
22.3 
 
12.0
 
South Korea 
 
1991-94
 
9.3 
 
3.5
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Sri Lanka 1991-94 22.6 8.2
 
Thailand 
 
1988-94
 
51.5 
 
12.3
 
Tunisia 
 
1992-94
 
17.6 
 
7.1
 
Turkey 
 
1992-93
 
5.7 
 
4.1
 
Venezuela 
 
1992-93
 
5.4 
 
3.3
1 Period during which the country experienced a surge in net private capital inflows. 
Sources:  World Bank, World Debt Tables, various issues and International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
 
Both cumulative inflows and peak inflows are sizable, particularly for some of the 
affected Asian economies, most notably Thailand and Malaysia.  In the case of the latter, 
inflows hit a peak of 23.2 percent of GDP in 1993.  Because a high share of those inflows 
were short term and perceived by the authorities to be “hot money,” capital controls on short 
term flows were introduced in Malaysia in January 1994.5  It is also noteworthy that two 
countries that were hard hit by the SS problem, Argentina during the Mexican tequilazo 
effect and Indonesia after the Thai baht was devalued, had relatively low capital inflows.  In 
both cases, however, domestic capital flight severely compounded the SS. 
 
As Table 2 shows, many of those countries listed as having experienced a surge in 
capital inflows in the earlier part of this decade are also listed as having suffered an abrupt 
capital account reversal and its accompanying need for a severe adjustment in the current 
account. Up until the recent Asian crises, Latin America was the region most prone to these 
large-scale capital inflow reversals.  Until the Thai crisis, which resulted in a 26 percentage 
point swing in private capital flows (from inflows of about 18 percent of GDP in 1996 to 
outflows of over 8 percent in 1997 ), Argentina’s crisis in the early 1980s had recorded one 
of the largest capital account reversals (20 percent).  However, the large historic discrepancy 
in capital account volatility and the severity of financial crises between Asia and Latin 
America appears to have eroded in the 1990s. This narrowing regional gap is also evident in 
various measures of the severity of the crises, an issue we turn to next. 
                                                 
5 Most of those controls were lifted in August of that year. 
Table 2. Selected Large Reversals in Net Private Capital Flows 
(as a percent of GDP) 
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Country/Episode Reversal 
 
Argentina, 1982-83
 
20
 
Argentina, 1994-95
 
4
 
Chile, 1981-83
 
7
 
Chile 1, 1990-91
 
8
 
Ecuador, 1995-96
 
19
 
Hungary, 1995-96
 
7
 
Indonesia, 1996-97
 
5
 
Malaysia 1, 1993-94
 
15
 
Mexico, 1981-83
 
12
 
Mexico, 1993-95
 
6
 
Philippines, 1996-97
 
7
 
Venezuela, 1992-94
 
9
 
South Korea, 1996-97
 
11
 
Thailand, 1996-97
 
26
 
Turkey, 1993-94
 
10
Sources: World Bank, World Debt Tables, various issues and Institute for International 
Economics, Comparative Statistics for Emerging market Economies, 1998. 
1 Reversal owing to the introduction of controls on capital inflows. 
 
C.  The severity of crises 
The preceding discussion has suggested that surges in capital inflows are often 
followed by these sudden stops.  With the exception of two episodes, Chile in 1990-91 and 
Malaysia in 1993-94, in which the reversal was deliberately engineered by the introduction 
of restrictions on short-term capital inflows, the negative capital account swing was 
involuntary (from the vantage point of the capital-importing country) and associated with a 
currency crisis and most often with a banking crisis as well.6 
                                                 
6 In the case of Chile, reserve requirements on short-term offshore borrowing are 
introduced in mid-1990; in Malaysia strict prohibitions on domestic residents’ sales of short-
term domestic assets to nonresidents are introduced in January 1994. 
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If we wish to assess whether the balance has tilted in recent years toward adjustment, 
despite larger bail-out packages from the international community, we must begin by 
comparing the severity of recent crises with their earlier counterparts.  We consider 
alternative ways of measuring the severity of the crisis. We should also review the extent of 
financing provided by the rescue packages, not only in their dollar value, as in commonly 
done but relative to the size of the recipient economy.  Table 3 documents some of these 
recent episodes. 
 Table 3. Recent Rescue Packages 
 
 
Country 
 
Year
 
Rescue Package 
(in US dollars) 
 
Rescue Package 
(As a percent of 
GDP)
 
Brazil 
 
1998
 
41.5 
 
5.3
 
Indonesia 
 
1997
 
40.0 
 
18.1
 
Korea 
 
1997
 
57.0 
 
11.7
 
Mexico 
 
1995
 
47.0 
 
13.5
 
Russia 
 
1998
 
22.6 
 
5.8
 
Thailand 
 
1997
 
20.1 
 
12.1
 
 
As discussed in Calvo (1998a), one of the reasons why the sudden stop may lead to a 
contraction in output has to do with large and unexpected swings in relative prices.  Consider 
the case where loans were extended to the nontraded sector, such as real estate, under the 
expectation that the price of nontraded goods relative to traded goods (the real exchange rate) 
would remain stable over the duration of the contract. Under these circumstances a large 
unexpected real depreciation could render many of these loans nonperforming. Hence, one 
measure of the severity of a crisis could include the magnitude of the real depreciation of the 
currency.  Also, the greater the extent to which the central bank has already depleted its stock 
of foreign exchange reserves by the time the crisis erupts–the greater the burden of 
adjustment that is required to close the current account deficit on short notice. 
 
To analyze this issue formally, we measure the severity of currency and banking 
crises as in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) and (1998).  For currency crises, we construct an 
index that gives equal weights to reserve losses and the real exchange rate depreciation.  This 
index is centered on the month of the currency crisis and it combines the percentage decline 
in foreign exchange reserves in the six months prior to the crisis, since reserve losses 
typically occur before the central bank capitulates and the real depreciation of the currency in 
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the six months following the abandonment of the existing exchange rate arrangement, be it a 
peg or a band.  While this is not akin to the unexpected portion of the relative price swing, it 
does provide a rough sense of the extent of the magnitude of the realignment.  As to the 
severity of banking crises, we use the cost of the bail-out as a share of GDP as our proxy. 
 
Table 4 presents these measures of severity for the 76 currency crises and 26 banking 
crises in the Kaminsky-Reinhart sample.7  For the 1970-1994 sample currency and banking 
crises were far more severe in Latin America than elsewhere.  The crises in East Asia, by 
contrast, were relatively mild and not that different by these metrics from the crises in the 
European countries that dominate the “others” group.   The picture that emerges during 
1995-1997 is distinctly different.  The Latin American crises include those of Mexico and 
Argentina in late 1994 and early 1995.  While the latter, did not devalue, it sustained major 
reserve losses associated with a series of bank runs that left the level of bank deposits by 
mid-March 1995 about 18-19 percent below their level prior to the devaluation of the 
Mexican peso.   
 
Both in terms of this measure of the severity of the currency crisis, as well as the 
estimated costs of bailing out the banking sector, the severity of the Asian crises even 
surpasses that of their Latin American counterparts in the 1990s and it is a significant 
departure from its historic regional norm.8  On the basis of these measures of severity–
                                                 
7 Details on sample coverage, definition and the dating of the crises are provided in  
Appendix Tables 1 and 2. 
8 Both banking and currency crises measures are statistically significant at standard 
confidence levels for the Asian sample.  For Latin America, there is weak evidence of a 
reduction in the severity of the crises, but owing to the large variance in the regional sample, 
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specifically the huge burden of bailing out the banks, as well as the orders of magnitude of 
the capital account reversal (Table 2) it does appear that during the course of the 1990s the 
balance between financing and adjustment has shifted toward 
 adjustment, despite the larger packages put together by the IMF during the recent crises in 
EMs. 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
we cannot conclude that this difference is statistically significant.   
 Table 4. The severity of crises: Then and now 
 
 
 
 
Currency crises 
 
Banking crises 
 
Period 
 
Latin 
America 
 
East Asia 
 
Others 
 
Latin 
America 
 
East Asia 
 
Others 
 
1970-1994 
 
48.1 
 
14.0 
 
9.0 
 
21.6 
 
2.8 
 
7.3 
 
1995-1997 
 
25.4 
 
40.01 
 
N.A. 
 
8.3 
 
15.01 
 
N.A. 
1 Difference from historic mean is statistically significant at standard confidence levels. 
Source: Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998). 
 
 
 
III. Collapsing Output and Protracted Banking Crises 
 
 
  
Table V.3 Annual indicators: Banking crises 
 
 
 11 
Sudden stops can lead to collapses in output and do severe damage to the financial 
system.  Indeed, nearly all the banking crises in our sample are associated with a negative 
reversal in capital inflows.9 While in most cases the banking sector problems begin before 
the SS–the abrupt capital flow reversal deepens the financial sector problems. Moreover, the 
Latin American crises and the Asian crises of the late 1990s are markedly more severe than 
the crises in Europe or in Asia’s own past.  In what follows, we examine the economic 
landscape in the aftermath of SSs and currency and banking crises.  The emphasis is on 
assessing the magnitude of the output losses and the economy’s speed and capacity to return 
to “normal.”  We also compare some of the recent experiences with the historical patterns.  
Before turning to the performance of real GDP in the post crisis period, however, we assess 
how various indicators often stressed in the literature on capital markets crises behave 
following the SS and, in particular, how many months elapse before their behavior returns to 
normal.  
 
                                                 
9 The link between currency crises and SS is less clear in our sample, as many of the 
currency crises took place in the 1970s in an environment of capital controls and highly 
regulated domestic financial markets. By contrast, nearly all the banking crises are in the 
post-liberalization period, hence, their closer link to the SS. 
To do so, we must define what is “normal.”  In what follows, we define periods of 
“tranquility” to exclude the 24 months before and after currency crises.  In the case of 
banking crises, the 24 months before the banking crisis beginning and 36 months following it 
are excluded from tranquil periods.  For each indicator, we tabulate its average behavior 
during “tranquil” periods.  We then compare the post-crisis behavior of the indicator to its 
average in periods of tranquility. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the results for that exercise for currency and banking crises 
separately, as we have stressed that banking crises have tended to be more protracted affairs 
and more closely linked with SS. The number reported is the average number of months that 
it takes that variable to reach its norm during tranquil periods.  In parentheses we note 
whether the level or growth rate of the variable remains above or below its norm in the post-
crisis period. 
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Several features are worth noting.  First, the analysis of the data bears out that 
banking crises have more lingering deleterious effects on economic activity than currency 
crises, this may be due to the kinds of Fisherian channels stressed in Calvo (1998a) or to a 
credit channel mechanism.  Whatever the explanation, this difference is evident in several of 
the indicators.  While the 12-month change in output remains below its norm in periods of 
tranquility for (on average) 10 months following the currency crash, it takes nearly twice that 
amount of time to recover following the banking crisis.  This more sluggish recovery pattern 
is also evident in imports, which take about 2 ½ years to return to their norm.  Bank deposits 
also remain depressed.  The weakness in asset prices, captured here by equity returns, persist 
for 30 months on average for banking crises, more than twice the time it takes to recover 
from a currency crash. It is worth recalling that assets, be it equity or real estate, are a 
common form of collateral against loans.  Hence, a collapse in asset prices may trigger 
margin calls and increase the incidence of nonperforming loans, worsening the problems in 
the banking sector.10  Interest rates remain high after the banking crisis, while this is not the 
case for currency crises.  This result is largely due to the fact that banking crises in our 
sample are clustered  in the post financial liberalization period, when interest rates are market 
determined.  By contrast, the number of currency crises are about evenly split into pre- and 
post liberalization sub-samples. In the case of the former, interest rate ceilings were prevalent 
among EMs, removing most of the information content of interest rates. 
                                                 
10 See Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) for details. 
 
Table 5.  The aftermath of financial crises 
(Average number of months it takes a variable to return to “normal” behavior after the 
crisis)1 
 
 
Indicator 
 
Banking crisis 
 
Currency crisis 
 
Bank deposits 
 
30 (below) 
 
12 (above) 
 
Domestic credit/GDP2 
 
15 (above) 
 
9 (above) 
 
Exports 
 
20 (below) 
 
8 (below) 
 
Imports 
 
29 (below) 
 
18 (below) 
 
M2/reserves 
 
15 (above) 
 
7 (above) 
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Output 18 (below) 10 (below) 
 
Real interest rate3 
 
15 (above) 
 
7 (below) 
 
Stock prices 
 
30 (below) 
 
13 (below) 
1 We note in parentheses whether the variable remained below or above the norm during 
periods of tranquility. 
2 Domestic credit/GDP remains above normal levels largely as a result of the marked decline 
in GDP following the crisis–it is a debt overhang. 
3 The disparity between the post-crisis behavior of real interest rates lies in the fact that a 
large share of the currency crises occurred in the 1970s, when interest rates were controlled 
and not very informative about market conditions. 
Source: Based on Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (1999). 
 
Secondly, Table 4 highlights that there are likely to be important sectoral differences 
in the pace of recovery, depending also on the type of crisis it is.  For instance, following the 
devaluations that characterize the bulk of the currency crises, exports recover relatively 
quickly and ahead of the rest of the economy at large.  However, following banking crises 
exports continue to sink for nearly two years following the onset of the crisis. This may be 
due to a persistent overvaluation (recall in this sample banking crises typically begin before 
currency crises), high real interest rates (the Fisherian channel), or a “credit crunch” story. 
 
 Table 6.  The protracted nature of banking crises:  
 Time elapsed from beginning of crisis to its peak 
 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Number of months 
 
Mean 
 
19 
 
Minimum 
 
  0 
 
Maximum 
 
53 
 
Standard deviation 
 
17 
Source: Based on Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). 
 
Table 5 highlights the protracted nature of banking crises by showing the average 
number of months elapsed from the beginning of the crisis to its zenith for the 26 banking 
crises studied in the Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) sample.  Hence, on average it takes a 
little over a year-and-a-half for a banking crisis to ripen; in some instances it has taken over 
four years.  This protracted profile is, in part, due to the fact that often the financial sector 
problems do not begin with the major banks, but rather, with more risky finance companies.  
As the extent of leveraging rises, households and firms become more vulnerable to any 
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adverse economic or political shocks that lead to higher interest rates and lower asset values. 
 Defaults increase and the problems spread to the larger institutions.  If there are banks runs, 
such as in Venezuela in 1994, the spread to the larger institutions may take less time. 
 
However, the information presented in Table 6 does not fully disclose the length of 
time that the economy may be weighed down by banking sector problems, as it does not 
provide information on the time elapsed between the crisis peak and its ultimate resolution.  
Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1996), who examine the resolution of several banking crises in 
Latin America, highlight the sluggishness of the resolution process in many episodes.  The 
Japanese banking crisis, which has spanned most of the 1990s and is ongoing, is a recent 
example of this sluggish recognition/admission/resolution process. 
 
We next focus on the evolution of GDP in the aftermath of crises. Tables 7-8 present 
the time profile of post-banking and currency crises deviations in GDP growth from the 
mean rate of growth during tranquil periods. We distinguish between the moderate inflation 
and high inflation countries; the latter encompass mostly Latin American countries.  We 
report averages for some of the recent crises separately and examine to what extent these 
depart from the historical averages.  
 
 Table 7. Real GDP growth in the aftermath of banking crises: 
 Deviations from “tranquil” periods 
 
 
Indicator 
 
t 
 
t+1 
 
t+2 
 
t+3 
 
1970-1994 sample: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      All countries 
 
-3.2 
 
-2.1 
 
-0.8 
 
-1.1 
 
      Moderate        
inflation  
     countries1 
 
 
-1.6 
 
 
-2.3 
 
 
-1.6 
 
 
-1.4 
 
      High-inflation    
    countries 
 
-4.5 
 
-1.7 
 
0.0 
 
-0.5 
 
Recent experiences 
 
-13.3 2 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
1 Moderate inflation countries are those with inflation rates below 100 percent in all years 
surrounding the crisis; high inflation countries are those in which inflation exceeded 100 
percent in at least one year. 
2 Includes Argentina, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, and Thailand.  Argentina is classified as a 
banking crisis (albeit a very mild one) owing to the widespread bank runs (see Kaminsky and 
Reinhart for a detailed discussion of dating banking crises.      
 3 Difference from the historic mean is significant at standard confidence levels. 
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Quite clearly, banking crises are contractionary and  recession is protracted.  Three 
years following the beginning of the crisis the economy still records growth rates below 
those posted in the two years preceding the crisis.  This is consistent with the earlier evidence 
showing that financial sector problems continued to worsen for sometime following the onset 
of the difficulties.  The deviations from pre-crises growth rates is even greater, because 
banking crises often appear following an unsustainable boom in capital inflows and 
economic activity.  The slump appears to be more severe but less protracted in high inflation 
countries.  As noted there are several explanations for the slump.  In addition to those already 
discussed, the collapse in asset prices that usually accompanies the crises may give rise to 
significant negative wealth effects and impact consumer spending.  Similarly, a credit 
channel story may lead to a severe contraction in investment. The credit crunch explanation 
is, indeed, a plausible one in light of banks’ need to recapitalize and provision.  The 
recessions following the recent crises are far more severe than the historic norm, even if 
Indonesia is excluded from the sample. 
 
Devaluations are perceived to be expansionary in industrial countries. This view is 
reflected in the assumed policy trade-off in many second generation models of currency 
crises, which stress the policymakers conflict between the credibility losses incurred if the 
peg is abandoned and the economic gains from devaluation.  While this proposition may be 
an adequate representation for industrial countries, the evidence presented here bears out the 
results of the earlier studies by Edwards and others.  As Table 7 highlights, currency crises 
do not appear to have a salutary effect on the economy, as growth remains below that 
observed during tranquil periods in the three years following the crisis.  Some of the most 
recent SS episodes, which have included both successful and unsuccessful speculative 
attacks, highlight the staggering output losses associated with the SS problem.  The last row 
of the table reports the averages for six recent episodes.  It includes two successful defenses, 
Argentina and Hong Kong and four successful attacks Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, and 
Thailand.  As shown, the output collapse in the year following the SS is dramatically higher 
than the comparable historic norm.  For all the devaluers in that recent sample these currency 
crises were also accompanied by deep and costly banking crises. As with banking crises, the 
recent output losses are a significant departure from the historic pattern. 
 
The results for the full sample reveal that the recessions are somewhat milder than 
those following a banking crisis.  Hence, reenforcing the results shown in Table 4, the 
moderate inflation economies appear to recover more quickly from a currency crisis than 
from a banking crisis–unless the currency collapse is accompanied by a banking crisis as 
well.11 
                                                 
11 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) present evidence that the twin crises are more 
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severe and the recovery more sluggish than episodes when currency crises are not associated 
with banking sector problems. 
 Table 8.  Real GDP growth in the aftermath of currency crises: 
 Deviations from tranquil periods 
 
 
Indicator 
 
t 
 
t+1 
 
t+2 
 
t+3 
 
1970-1994: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All countries 
 
-2.7 
 
-1.9 
 
-0.6 
 
-0.8 
 
    Moderate             
inflation  
    countries 1 
 
 
-1.9 
 
 
-1.6 
 
 
-0.7 
 
 
0.0 
 
    High-inflation      
     countries 
 
-3.8 
 
-2.2 
 
-0.1 
 
-1.5 
 
Recent experiences 
 
-12.3 2 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
1 Moderate inflation countries are those with inflation rates below 100 percent in all years 
surrounding the crisis; high inflation countries are those in which inflation exceeded 100 percent 
in at least one year. 
2 Includes two successful defenses, Argentina and Hong Kong and four successful attacks 
Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, and Thailand.  The successful defenses do not register as crises, but 
as turbulence–owing to the substantial reserve losses. 
 3 Difference from the historic mean is significant at standard confidence levels.  
 
 
IV.  Ameliorating the Sudden Stop Problem: 
 Is There a Role for Capital Controls? 
 
In principle, we would expect the volume and composition of capital inflows to respond 
to the policy stance that the recipient countries adopt.  In some instances, domestic policies were 
explicitly designed precisely to shape the volume and/or composition of inflows (capital 
controls).  In others the effects the policies were largely unintended (sterilized intervention). In 
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this section, we briefly review the evidence on the effects of these policies. The discussion draws 
heavily on Montiel and Reinhart (1999), hence, its scope is limited to assessing the effectiveness 
of controls of various types on capital inflows.  Controls on capital outflows, which are often 
introduced during or after crises (as Malaysia did after the 1997 Asian crisis) are not considered 
here. We also discuss the relative merits of some variants to the types of policies adopted by 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, and Malaysia, which primarily targeted either 
short-term or portfolio inflows.   
 
A.  Empirical evidence on controls 
It remains controversial whether the intent to influence the volume or composition of 
flows has been successful during these experiences in the 1990s. Here we provide a brief 
summary of the key findings of Montiel and Reinhart (1999) on the basis of  panel data 
containing annual observations on the volume and composition of capital inflows for 15 
emerging markets over the 1990-1996 period.  The countries in our sample are listed at the 
bottom of Table 9.  The analysis disaggregates among three types of capital flows: portfolio 
flows, short-term flows, and FDI.  The results for the capital account balance are also 
reported.  Further details on the data, the measures that proxy for capital controls and 
sterilization, and the methodology employed are available from the original paper. 
  
 Table 9. Fixed Effects Estimates, Instrumental Variables: 1990-1996 
 15-Country Panel 
 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
Sterilization 
index
 
Capital 
control 
proxy
 
U.S. interest 
rate
 
Japanese 
interest 
rate
 
Number of 
listed stocks
 
Capital account 
as a % of GDP 
 
1.762 
(2.927)
 
-0.716 
(-1.092)
 
-0.224 
(-1.931)
 
-0.425 
(-2.311)
 
0.006 
(2.653)
 
Portfolio flows 
as a % of GDP 
 
0.374 
(1.064)
 
-0.238 
(-0.976)
 
-0.313 
(-3.046)
 
-0.161 
(-1.025)
 
0.017 
(2.826)
 
Short-term flows 
as a % of GDP 
 
0.902 
(2.335)
 
-0.451 
(-1.081)
 
-0.048 
(-0.518)
 
-0.136 
(0.883)
 
0.001 
(0.612)
 
Portfolio plus 
short-term flows  
as a % of GDP 
 
0.870 
(2.344)
 
-0.642 
(-1.302)
 
-0.210 
(-1.116)
 
-0.070 
(-0.822)
 
0.009 
(2.184)
 
FDI flows 
as a % of GDP 
 
0.913 
(1.145)
 
1.785 
(0.792)
 
-0.149 
(-1.032)
 
-0.122 
(-1.116)
 
-0.001 
(-0.024)
 
Portfolio plus 
short-term flows  
 
34.709 
(1.986)
 
-32.856 
(-2.233)
 
-30.913 
(-1.321)
 
13.051 
(1.225)
 
n.a.
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as a% of total flows 
 
FDI flows as a 
share of total flows 
 
-18.900 
(-1.936)
 
43.753 
(1.894)
 
32.776 
(1.672)
 
-9.976 
(-1.018)
 
n.a.
Notes: The countries in the sample are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Czech republic, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, and Uganda. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors have been 
corrected for general forms of heteroskedasticity. An n.a. denotes not applicable. 
 
 
The key findings that can be gleaned from Table 8 can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Sterilized intervention increases the volume of total capital flows, through short-term 
capital.  Portfolio flows and FDI do not appear to be responsive to the intensity of 
sterilization.  By widening and preserving domestic-foreign interest rate differentials, 
sterilized intervention significantly alters the composition of capital flows, increasing the 
share of short-term and portfolio flows.  This may be taken as an argument against “a soft 
peg,” as the capacity for sterilized intervention is limited or non-existent in a currency board 
arrangement.  An issue we will take up later. 
 
2. Although the signs of the estimates are negative, capital controls appear to have no 
statistically significant effect on reducing the overall volume of flows. Capital controls, 
however, do appear to alter the composition of capital flows in the direction usually intended 
by these measures, reducing the share of short-term and portfolio flows while increasing that 
of  FDI. 
 
3. As in most of the earlier literature on this subject, foreign interest rates appear to have 
a significant effect on both the volume and composition of flows.  Specifically, total capital 
flows, and especially portfolio flows, respond systematically to changes in U.S. and Japanese 
interest rates in the direction suggested by theory--even after controlling for some of the 
domestic policy fundamentals and some of the characteristics of the capital market. 
 
B. Some thoughts on alternative measures 
Some caveats about the previous results, however, are in order.  While these results 
clearly show that taxes or reserve requirements targeting short-term inflows had a significant 
effect on the maturity profile of the flows, we do not know whether this is, to some extent, an 
artifact of  reclassification.  We also do not know to what degree these measures simply 
encouraged a substitution of foreign short-term for domestic short-term debt.12  To the extent 
                                                 
12 In fact, the insignificant effect of controls on the volume of capital inflows, even 
though there is a noticeable lengthening of the maturity structure of those flows, strongly 
suggests that the system as a whole must have ways to effectively bypass and neutralize 
those controls.  
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that domestic short-term debt is also an implicit claim on the reserves of the central bank, 
then such a substitution would not ameliorate the liquidity problems during a SS.  An 
exception would be the case where through “moral suasion” the government and the central 
bank have greater leverage in “persuading” the local residents to roll over those debts.  This 
has been, to some degree, the case of Brazil, where the debt is largely from the public sector. 
 Such leverage would be less likely if the domestic debt that needs to be rolled over is 
private. 
 
If part of the general problem of the SS is short-term debt (irrespective of whether it 
is domestic or external) then, obviously, EM governments should adopt more conservative 
debt management strategies and lengthen the maturity of their debt.  However, while a 
prudent public debt management strategy is necessary to ameliorate the SS problem, it is 
doubtful that it is sufficient.  In Korea it was the banks which were borrowing short.  It is 
worth noting that the balance sheet problems of the banks in all these recent crises involved 
both currency and maturity mismatches.  Furthermore, the problem is not limited to the 
banks--in Indonesia it was the corporate sector.  In this regard, a tax on all short-term 
borrowing may be a preferable strategy to just taxing foreign short-term borrowing.  In this 
case of banks, this could be through high reserve requirements for shorter maturity deposits, 
irrespective of the currency of denomination of the deposit.  Thus, governments that pursues 
capital controls will likely be driven to cast a wide net which covers all financial 
intermediaries, and even nonfinancial corporations, since the latter participate in the sizable 
interenterprise credit market (see Ramey (1992))  This is an enormous task.  Moreover, 
countries that succeed in this task may find themselves deeply immersed in central planning. 
 Therefore, capital controls can at best be a short-term response to capital inflows or 
outflows.  
 
Sterilized intervention policies during the capital inflow period should be 
discouraged, since typically these open market operations place more short-term debt in the 
hands of the private sector.  In several episodes (see Reinhart and Reinhart, 1998), the 
objective to sterilize led central banks to complement the stock of public sector debt with 
debt of their own, adding an important  quasi-fiscal dimension to short-term debt problem.  
This would be no major problem if central banks held in stock sterilized reserves as a backup 
for the associated central bank short-term obligations.  In practice, however, there is strong 
temptation to utilize those reserves for other purposes (prominently bailing out the financial 
sector, as in Mexico and Thailand). 
 
V. Fixed versus flexible exchange rates: Revisiting an old debate 
 
Previous sections have established the extreme severity of recent EM crises.  In 
addition, we have argued that the SS episodes are associated with a previous surge of capital 
inflows, and that the size of SS is enhanced by the presence of short-term maturity debt (both 
domestic and external).  Unfortunately, what may appear as a natural line of defense, namely, 
imposing controls on international capital mobility is fraught with serious implementation 
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problems and, if maintained over the medium term, it may imply a gradual reversion to 
central planning. 
 
A. Fixed versus flexible exchange rates  
In this section we will discuss the role of the foreign exchange system.  All crisis 
episodes took place against a background of soft-pegged exchange rates.  This has led many 
analysts to conclude that “the peg did it.”  At some level, the statement is right because if the 
exchange rate was allowed to float freely, some of the international reserve loss would have 
been prevented.  However, even at this level of abstraction, the analysis is seriously 
incomplete.  It misses a key point, namely, that in many crisis episodes, either the government 
or the private sector, or both, had relatively large foreign-exchange denominated short-term 
debt obligations, which exceeded by far the stock of international reserves.   Therefore, the 
balance-of-payments crises are likely to have taken place under more flexible exchange rate 
arrangements as well. In effect, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines were classified as 
managed floats, while both Mexico and Indonesia had exchange rate bands.   
 
However, at a deeper level it could be argued that liability dollarization is partly a 
result of pegging, magnified by the overconfidence and moral hazard problems that pegging 
may bring about.  As the argument usually goes, if the exchange rate was free to float, 
domestic investors, especially those in the nontradable sector, would shy away from foreign-
exchange denominated loans.  This is so because they will now face a larger currency risk 
than under fix.  This sounds convincing, but it misses two important points: (1) most EMs 
start from a situation of partial dollarization (at the very least, liability dollarization), and (2) 
it is really very hard to find instances in which an EM completely ignores exchange rate 
volatility.  These points reinforce each other.  Partial dollarization increases the cost of 
exchange rate volatility (through the Fisherian channel, for example) which, in turn, induces 
the central bank to intervene in the foreign exchange markets to prevent fluctuations in the 
nominal exchange rate.  In fact, as the cases of El Salvador, the Philippines and Venezuela 
attest, this “fear of floating” may be so severe that the exchange rate spends long stretches of 
time at a fixed level, making it observationally equivalent to a soft peg.13  On the other hand, 
fear of floating induces more liability dollarization, creating a vicious circle from which it is 
very hard to exit.  In addition, fear of floating arises whenever domestic firms utilize foreign 
raw materials.  In this case, floating is less destructive than in the previous example but it can 
still cause financial difficulties in the medium term.  Fear of floating and lack of the discipline 
that underlies fixed exchange rates may drive authorities to adopt additional control measures, 
like dual exchange rates and controls on capital mobility. Even when fear of floating does not 
lead to capital controls and countries adopt “market-friendly” ways of stabilizing the 
exchange rate through open market operations, such policies have significant costs both in 
                                                 
13 This was also the case for Mexico prior to the Colosio assassination, despite an 
announces ever-widening band.  
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terms of the interest rate volatility associated with them as well as their procyclical nature.14  
Thus, contrary to the view that floating provides authorities with an extra degree of freedom 
to guarantee a market-friendly environment, the opposite may happen. 
 
                                                 
14 There are plenty of examples of interest rate hikes during “bad states of nature” 
(i.e. terms-of-trade declines, recessions, etc.). 
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Traditional theory teaches that the choice of a foreign exchange regime ought to be a 
function of the nature of shocks.  The basic lesson is:  If the shocks are mostly real, float; 
otherwise, fix (for a simple presentation of this theory that incorporates some key aspects of 
the current policy debate, see Calvo (1999b)).  Recent crisis episodes, though, show that 
shocks come prominently through the capital account and, as a result, they contain both real 
and nominal components, so the choice of the exchange rate system on that basis becomes 
more difficult.15  In addition, a major deficiency of received theory is that it takes shocks as 
fully exogenous, when all available evidence points in the direction that credibility and 
reputation are critical in determining how hard is an EM hit by financial turmoil, i.e., how big 
are the shocks.  In fact, Argentina’s dollarization proposal is an attempt to make policymaking 
more credible and, thus, lower country risk differentials (see Calvo,1999a for further 
discussion). 
 
Moreover, traditional theory can be criticized even on its own grounds.   Traditional 
theory ranks foreign exchange regimes by their associated output volatility.  Financial and 
Fisherian considerations, however, lead one also to worry about relative-price volatility and, 
in particular, volatility of the real exchange rate.  As shown in Calvo (1999 b), focusing on 
real exchange rate volatility drastically changes traditional ranking.  With sticky prices, for 
example, fixed would obviously dominate floating exchange rates.   
 
Another weakness of traditional theory is oversimplification.  Defenders of floating 
exchange rates on these grounds point to the fact that flexible exchange rates make the 
adjustment of relative prices less costly, because equilibrium changes can be accommodated 
by a higher or a lower exchange rate with little effect on output and employment.   This point 
is well taken in the context of a Mickey Mouse textbook model with homogeneous tradables 
and nontradables.  However, in a realistic economy there are several distinct goods, each with 
distinct labor market: gauchos cannot be quickly retrained as nuclear physicists, and 
viceversa.  Thus, given wages, a 20 percent fall in the international price of meat, for instance, 
may call for an equiproportional currency devaluation to ensure gauchos’ full employment.  
But a 20 percent devaluation might generate excess demand and inflation in physics.  More 
generally, the problem is that the exchange is only one instrument, and price/wage stickiness 
is a multidimensional issue.  Devaluation is not a silver bullet.  Devaluation in practice is an 
exercise in political compromise.  Gauchos want 20 percent, physicists less than that 
(assuming that they dislike inflation).  As a result, devaluation makes no group totally happy.  
Finally, devaluation can be substituted by fiscal policy.  If the real exchange rate is 
                                                 
15 
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overappreciated, for example, labor subsidies can be put in place to replicate, in a more 
controlled way, the desired real depreciation. 
 
Let us now turn to dollarization.  Dollarization has been criticized on the following 
grounds:  (1) it leaves the country without a lender of last resort, and (2) use of a foreign 
money may entail loss of seigniorage.16  Both of these criticisms have easy answers.  Starting 
with (2), the two countries involved (i.e., the dollarized EM and the country which currency is 
utilized by the EM) could share the seigniorage (as proposed by Argentina, see Calvo 
(1999a)).  Moreover, (1) would hold true to the extent that the lender of last resort has no 
genuine resources of its own and has to rely on money issuance.  As shown in Calvo (1999a), 
however, under dollarization and a seigniorage-sharing arrangement, a large portion of 
international reserves could be used to provide lender-of-last-resort services.  This would, of 
course, require the holding of a large enough stock of reserves, or the creation of a 
“stabilization fund” by foreign donors. 
 
In summary, much of the glitter of flexible exchange rates disappears upon closer 
examination.  The extra degrees of freedom provided by exchange rate flexibility are 
fallacious or can be substituted by fiscal policy.  Finally, strong pegs like dollarization can 
help to reduce the incidence of external shocks, especially those that filter through the capital 
account.  Granted, not every EM needs to go that far, and not every EM could go that far, but 
dollarization is not the silly idea that conventional thinkers would have us believe.  
 
C. Dollarization from the United States perspective 
We have presented arguments to suggest that dollarization may an attractive option for 
EMs to deal the problems of recurring and all-too-frequent SSs.   While, full dollarization will 
not eliminate banking sector problems, it may ameliorate them if it reduces the problems that 
stem from currency and maturity mismatches, and it will do away with speculative attacks on 
the currency.  After all, speculators cannot attack the peso if a peso does not exist.  We next 
address the benefits or costs does full dollarization carry for the United States. 
 
The issue that monetary policy for fully dollarized EMs will be set by the Federal 
Open Market Committee in the United States is not novel.  As shown in Calvo, Leiderman, 
and Reinhart (1993) and other studies, U.S. interest rates have long influenced capital flows to 
EMs, particularly in Latin America. From the U.S. vantage point, the only difference is that 
under full dollarization the exportation of U.S. policies is made more transparent. Nor is the 
seigniorage issue new.  As noted earlier, many EMs are already heavily dollarized. 
Incremental seigniorage is likely to be a marginal consideration.  One concern, frequently 
voiced by those who suggest that the U.S. should not encourage dollarization, is that the U.S. 
will be heavily involved in large bailout packages for EMs.   Yet, this issue is also not new.  
                                                 
16 In addition, it has been criticized for making costly relative price changes.  But this 
issue has been discussed above. 
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Direct and indirect involvement (via influencing IMF lending) by the U.S. has already 
skyrocketed in the 1990s, as witnessed by the unprecedented size of the bailouts. As to the 
potential effects of full dollarization by EMs on the U.S. real economy, we next consider three 
possible effects. 
 
First, the constituency opposing trade agreements between the U.S. and EMs on the 
grounds that a reduction in trade barriers places U.S. labor at a disadvantage should welcome 
dollarization.  After all, if a country is fully dollarized it cannot gain a trade advantage by 
frequently devaluing its currency and making its goods and labor relatively cheap. For 
example, the massive realignment between Mexican and U.S. wages in dollar terms that 
occurred in late 1994-1995 could not have taken place.  Other things equal, this inability to 
devalue bodes well for narrowing the persistent U.S. current account deficit.  We can refer to 
this channel as a relative price effect. 
Second, if full dollarization ameliorates the SS problem, for the reasons discussed 
earlier, the U.S. stands to gain from the more stable and sustained income gains of its trading 
partners.  We have seen U.S. exports adversely affected by the output collapses in Asia and by 
Mexico’s 1995 recession. In that regard, if U.S. exports are to benefit from greater income 
stability and growth in any region of the world, it would be from Latin America.  Table 9 
reports the share of U.S. imports in the total imports of selected trading partners in the 
Americas, Europe and Asia.  It is fairly evident that the Latin American countries have the 
highest propensity to import from the U.S.  Seventy five percent of Mexico’s imports come 
from the U.S., more than nine times the share in European imports. Hence, if EMs in Latin 
America were to dollarize, the U.S. current account deficit would also benefit from this 
income effect. 
 
Lastly, and related to the previous points, U.S. financial institutions that operate 
overseas are likely to benefit from dollarization in EMs. U.S. financial institutions would 
enjoy a comparative edge stemming from the fact that such institutions have expertise in 
intermediating dollar funds that could be applied to EMs. As opposed to local financial 
institutions, U.S. ones benefit more from scale economies.  Moreover, they would have ready 
access to a lender of last resort of U.S. dollars, whereas the financial institutions in EMs 
would have a more limited security blanket.     
 
Table 10. IMPORTS FROM THE US AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS  
FOR SELECTED  COUNTRIES 
 
Country
 
1991
 
1992 1993 1994 1995
 
1996 1997 
The Americas 
 
Canada 
 
62.29% 
 
63.52% 65.05% 65.75% 66.75%
 
67.41% 67.51%
 
Argentina             
 
18.1% 
 
21.71% 23.01% 22.13% 19.02%
 
19.91% 20.04%
 
Brazil                  
 
23.25% 
 
24.53% 23.5% 20.57% 21.15%
 
22.10% 23.34%
 
 Chile                 
 
20.58% 
 
20.14% 22.58% 22.69% 24.50%
 
23.57% 22.94%
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Colombia             
 
37.15% 
 
38.47% 35.57% 32.13% 39.09%
 
36.19% 35.13%
 
Mexico 
 
73.93% 
 
71.27% 71.2% 71.85% 74.53%
 
75.59% 74.84%
 
 
 
Asia 
 
China 
 
12.54% 
 
10.88% 10.27% 12.09% 12.21%
 
11.64% 11.46%
 
Japan 
 
22.67% 
 
22.63% 23.15% 23.01% 22.59%
 
22.86% 22.43%
 
Korea 
 
23.19% 
 
22.36% 21.39% 21.08% 22.49%
 
22.14% 20.73%
 
Indonesia 
 
13.10% 
 
14.01% 11.49% 11.32% 11.38%
 
11. 78% 12.72%
 
Malaysia 
 
15.31% 
 
15.86% 16.93% 16.62% 16.31%
 
15.48% 16.55%
 
Thailand 
 
10.52% 
 
11.74% 11.68% 11.86% 11.54%
 
12.6% 13.79%
 
 
 
Europe 
 
France 
 
9.53% 
 
8.39% 8.72% 8.46% 7.59%
 
7.73% 8.66%
 
Germany 
 
6.64% 
 
6.72% 7.35% 7.39% 7.07%
 
7.32% 7.75%
 
Spain 
 
7.67% 
 
7.37% 6.87% 7.30% 6.42%
 
6.33% 6.33%
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1998, and various 97 and 98 issues. 
 
VI. Concluding Thoughts 
In this paper we have presented evidence that SS problems have become more severe 
for EMs, particularly for Asian economies that historically had a comparatively more placid 
economic cycle than their Latin American counterparts.  Because policy options are relatively 
limited in the midst of a capital market crisis and because so many EMs have already had 
crises recently, we have focused on some of the kinds of policies that could reduce the 
incidence of crises in the first place, or at least make the SS problem less severe.  In this 
regard, we considered the relative merits of capital controls and dollarization.  Floating is, of 
course, another option but, for the reasons discussed, earlier we are doubtful that many EMs 
will be ready to embrace floatation along the lines practiced in only a handful of industrial 
countries. We conclude that, while the evidence suggests that capital controls appear to 
influence the composition of flows skewing flows away from short maturities, such policies 
are not likely to be a long-run solution to the recurring problem of sudden capital flow 
reversals. Yet, because fear of floating, many EMs are likely to turn to increased reliance on 
controls. Dollarization would appear to have the edge as a more market-oriented option to 
ameliorate, if not eliminate, the SS problem. 
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 Appendix Table 1. Crises Definitions 
 
Currency 
Crisis  
 
Most often, currency crises are resolved through a devaluation of the domestic currency or the 
floatation of the exchange rate.  But central banks often resort to an interest rate defense and 
foreign exchange market intervention to fight the speculative attack.  In these latter cases, 
currency market turbulence will be reflected in steep increases in domestic interest rates and 
massive losses of foreign exchange reserves.  Hence, an index of currency crises should 
capture these different manifestations of speculative attacks.  We constructed an index of 
currency market turbulence as a weighted average of exchange rate changes and reserve 
changes. Interest rates were excluded as many emerging markets in our sample had interest 
rate controls through much of the sample. 
The index, I, is a weighted average of the rate of change of the exchange rate, Δe/e, and of 
reserves, ΔR/R, with weights such that the two components of the index have equal sample 
volatilities 
 
                  I = (Δe/e) - (σe/σR)*( ΔR/R) 
 
where σe is the standard deviation of the rate of change of the exchange rate and σR is the 
standard deviation of the rate of change of reserves. Since changes in the exchange rate enter 
with a positive weight and changes in reserves have a negative weight attached, readings of 
this index that were three standard deviations or more above the mean were cataloged as 
crises. For countries in the sample that had hyperinflation, the construction of the index was 
modified. While a 100 percent devaluation may be traumatic for a country with low-to-
moderate inflation, a devaluation of that magnitude is commonplace during hyperinflation. A 
single index for the countries that had hyperinflation episodes would miss sizable devaluations 
and reserve losses in the moderate inflation periods, since the historic mean is distorted by the 
high-inflation episode. To avoid this, we divided the sample according to whether inflation in 
the previous six months was higher than 150% and then constructed an index for each 
subsample. Our cataloging of crises for the countries coincides fairly highly with our 
chronology of currency market disruptions. 
 
Banking 
crisis 
 
With regard to banking crises, our analysis stresses events.  The main reason for following this 
approach has to do with the lack of high frequency data that capture when a financial crisis is 
underway.  If the beginning of a banking crisis is marked by a bank runs and withdrawals, then 
changes in bank deposits could be used to date the crises.  Often, the banking problems do not 
arise from the liability side, but from a protracted deterioration in asset quality, be it from a 
collapse in real estate prices or increased bankruptcies in the nonfinancial sector.  In this case, 
changes in asset prices or a large increase in bankruptcies or nonperforming loans could be 
used to mark the onset of the crisis.  For some of the earlier crises in emerging markets, 
however, stock market data is not available.4 Indicators of business failures and nonperforming 
loans are also usually available only at low frequencies, if at all; the latter are also made less 
informative by banks’ desire to hide their problems for as long as possible. 
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 Appendix Table 2. Crisis Dates 
 
Country 
 
Currency crisis 
 
Beginning of Banking Crisis 
 
Argentina 
 
June 1975 
February 1981* 
July 1982 
September 1986* 
April 1989 
February 1990 
 
 
March 1980 
 
May 1985 
 
December 1994 
 
Bolivia 
 
November 1982 
November 1983 
September 1985 
 
 
 
October 1987 
 
Brazil 
 
February 1983 
November 1986* 
July 1989 
November 1990 
October 1991 
 
 
November 1985 
 
 
December 1994 
 
Chile 
 
December 1971 
August 1972 
October 1973 
December 1974 
January 1976 
August 1982* 
September 1984 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 1981 
 
Colombia 
 
March 1983* 
February 1985* 
 
July 1982 
 
Denmark 
 
May 1971 
June 1973 
November 1979 
August 1993 
 
 
 
March 1987 
 
 
Finland 
 
June 1973 
October 1982 
November 1991* 
September 1992* 
 
 
 
September 1991 
 
Indonesia 
 
November 1978 
April 1983 
September 1986 
August 1997 
 
 
 
November 1992 
 
Israel 
 
November 1974 
November 1977 
October 1983* 
July 1984 
 
 
 
 
October 1983 
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Country Currency crisis Beginning of Banking Crisis 
 
Malaysia 
 
July 1975 
August 1997* 
 
July 1985 
September 1997 
 
Mexico 
 
September 1976 
February 1982* 
December 1982* 
December 1994* 
 
 
September 1982 
 
October 1992 
 
Norway 
 
June 1973 
February 1978 
May 1986* 
December 1992 
 
 
 
November 1988 
 
Peru 
 
June 1976 
October 1987 
 
March 1983 
 
Philippines 
 
February 1970 
October 1983* 
June 1984 
July 1997* 
 
 
January 1981 
 
July 1997 
 
Spain 
 
February 1976 
July 1977* 
December 1982 
February 1986 
September 1992 
May 1993 
 
 
November 1978 
 
Sweden 
 
August 1977 
September 1981 
October 1982 
November 1992* 
 
 
 
 
November 1991 
 
Thailand 
 
November 1978* 
July 1981 
November 1984 
July 1997* 
 
March 1979 
 
 
May 1996 
 
Turkey 
 
August 1970 
January 1980 
March 1994* 
 
 
 
January 1991 
 
Uruguay 
 
December 1971* 
October 1982* 
 
March 1971 
March 1981 
 
Venezuela 
 
February 1984 
December 1986 
March 1989 
May 1994* 
December 1995 
 
 
 
 
October 1993 
* Twin crises episode. 
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